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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
THERALD N. JENSEN, Executor of
the Estate of CLARENCE ANDERSON, Deceased,
Pktintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HENRY 0. ANDERSON and DOROTHY ANDERSON, husband and
wife,
Defendants-Appellants,
vs.
ROBERT RADAKOVICH,
Intervenor-Respondent.

Case No.
11367

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an
alleged option to purchase.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court and an advisory
jury. From a judgment for the Intervenor, the Plaintiff and Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Defendants seek reversal of the
judgment and judgment in their favor as a matter of
law.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
One Clarence Anderson died on July 13, 1966,
and Letters Testamentary on his estate were issued
on August 9, 1966 to the Plaintiff and Appellant,
(hereinafter referred to as the "Plaintiff"). On October 11, 1966, the Intervenor and Respondent, (hereinafter referred to as the "Intervenor"), served upon
the Plaintiff notice that he exercised an alleged Option to Purchase, purportedly signed by the decendent
Clarence Anderson, and made a tender of $26,975.00,
which was refused by the Plaintiff as Executor of
said decedent's estate. Henry 0. Anderson, Defendant
and Appellant, (hereinafter referred to as the "Defendant"), filed a notice with Plaintiff as Executor
that he was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the real property and water stock listed as
an asset of the aforesaid decedent's estate. The Plaintiff thereafter instituted a suit to quiet title as against
the Defendant Henry 0. Anderson and his wife Dorothy, and Robert Radakovich intervened and set up his
alleged option to purchase. The Plaintiff denied the
validity of the option; affirmatively alleged that there
was no consideration for the option; denied that the
decedent signed the option; affirmatively alleged that
the decedent was illiterate, and if it was established
that he did sign the option that he did not understand
the same; and that the alleged option being incomplete,
indefinite and uncertain, it was unenforceable and
void. The Defendant denied the validity of the option
upon the ground that the decedent, in winding up the
1
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dissolved partnership that ·at one time existed between
himself and the decedent, was without authority to
contract for the sale of partnership a;ssets without his
express consent, and that title to a portion ·of the property described in the alleged option was in the name
of the Defendant. Thus the issues were joined~ ahd the
trial held thereon. The lo)-ver court submitted but one
interrogatory to the jury: "Did Clarence Andersop.
sign the paper styled 'Option to Purchase' * * * ?"A
majority of the jurors answered in the affirmative, and
the lower court adopted the jury's finding, and on all
the remaining issues, both of fact and of law, found
in favor of the Intervenor and against the Plaintiff
and Defendant; fixed the monetary value of the remaining interest of Henry Anderson; and provided
terms of payment by the Intervenor. From this decree
the Plaintiff and Defendant prosecute this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION IS INDEFINITE
AND UNCERTAIN, AND RESERVED TO THE OP~
TIONEE AN UNLIMITED OPTION TO DETERMINE THE
EXTENT OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF ITS TERMS.

The alleged option reserve to the optionee an unlimited right to determine whether he will purchase
from the optionee any or all of the property owned by
the optioner, thereby giving him an unlimited election
as to whether he would purchase any or all of the range
ground, and any or all of the sheep.
As to terms of payment provided for in the al3

leged option, they lack certainty in several respects.
There is no specification as to how the payments are
to be made: annually, semi-annually, or lump sum at
the end of the term? How the interest was to be paid:
annually, semi-annually, or monthly? Was there to
be a conveyance of the real estate and a mortgage
back to secure payment, or was a contract of sale con·
templated? If the optionee elected to purchase the
sheep, and paid down one-fourth of their value, with
the balance to be paid in 17 years, y,-ould he be required
to keep the herd at the same level or could he with
impunity dispose of any or all of the sheep? Obviously,
numerous questions and situations are suggested by a
mere reading of the unlimited provisions of the alleged
option which determine its uncertainty and indefinitness in all particulars. In 12 Arn. J ur. Contracts, 558,
Sec. 66, it is said:
A reservation to either party to a contract
of an unlimited right to determine the nature
and extent of his performance, renders his obligation too indefinite for legal enforcement.
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d
491, this Court had under consideration an earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase, of which specific
perforrnance was demanded. The offer to purchase,
under consideration in that case provided that a balance of $25,000.00 was to be carried by the seller on
contract or second rnortgage. This Court posed the
question:
Which would the court require? * * * How
4

are the payments to be made: annually, semiannually, or lump sum at the end of the term?
How was interest to be paid: annually, semiannually, or monthly?* * *.
And, this Court held that the earnest money receipt
r.nd off e1· to purchase lacked such certainty as to prevent the court from granting specific performance.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff poses the question: Are not the identical uncertainties present in the
alleged option to purchase now before this Court?
In Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 Pac.
1101, this Court quoted with approval Page on Contracts as follows:
In order to be the basis of a decree of
specific performance in equity, the contract
must be so certain that the chancellor's decree
can specify exactly what must be done in order
to comply therewith. A lack of certainty as to
the length of time that the contract is to remain
in force, or as to the method of securing obligations for deferred payments, prevents specific
performance.
However, the district court in the instant case
did undertake to make certain that which was uncertain, and to specify that the balance of the principal
should be paid within 17 years; that interest should be
paid at least anniwlly; and that legal title should remain in the beneficiaries under the will of Clarence
Anderson, deceased, until paid.
The option to purchase with which we are con5

c'erned in this cause was personally prepared and drafted by the Intervenor himself. (See: Published deposition of Robert Radakovich at page 7, lines 21and22).
Options for the purchase of real estate are usually
strictly construed as against the person whose right it
is to exercise the option. Krall v. Light, 210 S.W.2d
739 and Johnson v. Smith; 269 P.2d 384. And this
Court held quite specifically· in Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah
2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 that it is in agreement with the
well-recognized rule that where there is uncertainty
or ambiguity the contract should be strictly construed
against him who draws it.
THERE WAS NO
LEGED OPTION.

POINT II
CONS~DERATION

FOR THE AL-

The position of the lower court was that an option itself doesn't require a consideration. (See: Transcript of Proceedings page 7, lines 11 and 12; Transcript of May 20, 1968, page 76, lines 14 and 15, and
page 79, lines 23 and 24).
The authorities are in harmony that an option to
be valid and effective must be supported by a consideration. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, p. 848, Sec.
7, and 55 Am. Jur. Vendor & Purchaser, p. 502, Sec.
32.
It is conceded that the authorities disagree as to
whether a nominal consiqeration is sufficient; however, in the instant case itis the position of the Plaintiff that the alleged option was without consideration.
The alleged option m question recites: "Con6

sideration: Robert Radakovich has helped me a lot on
the place building sheds, with my s~lling. .ancl_; buyfog
plus numerous other tasks all at no cost to me, which
would be great if paid for." This is the 3.lleged consideration for the option as stated by the lnterv.enor
himself, he having personally drafted the alleged. doc~~
ment; and the lips of the decedent, Clarence Anderson,
are sealed by death. This -is the allege9.. opt~on that
Calvin Rampton, as attorney, suggested to the lntervenor should be replaced by a legal one. (See: Published deposition of Robert Radakovich at page 14, lines
21 and 22, and page 15, lines 1, 2 and 3). Specifically
and unequivocally, the reference in the alleged option
is to a past consideration which would support no
promise whatever. In 17 C.J.S. Contracts, pages 83738, Sec. 116, appears a concise statement on this subject:
* * * by the great weight of authority a
past consideration, if it imposed no legal obligation at the time it was furnished, will support no promise whatever. * * *
A past consideration, it is said, is some
act or f orebearance in times past by which a m~
has benefited without thereby incurring any
legal liability; if afterward, whether from a
good feeling or :from interested motives, he
makes a promise to the person by whose act or
forebearance has benefited, and that promise is
made on no other consideration than the past
benefit, it is gratuitdus and cannot be enforced;
it is based on motive and not consideration. Thus
services rendered or money expended in the past,
but not at the express or implied request of the
7

person benefited by them, or at his request but
without an understanding that they were to be
paid for, will not support a promise by him to
pay for them.
And, it is further stated in the same authority at page
778, Sec. 90 :
Where services are rendered and benefits
conferred without any request and under circumstances rendering lack of expectation to be
compensated therefor highly improbable, no obligation to make such compensation arises and a
promise founded on motives of honor or gratitude is not a sufficient consideration.
The purported consideration recited in the alleged
option is not supported by the evidence-there is testimony, both oral and documentary, that the help rendered Clarence Anderson by the Intervenor, was not
at no cost.
Assuming for purpose of argument that the Intervenor had helped the decedent at no cost to him, and
that this created a moral obligation on the part of the
decedent to compensate the Intervenor, such moral
obligation would not constitute a valid consideration.
In Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177,
this court said:
The rule quite generally recognized is that
a moral obligation by itself will not do so (constitute a valid consideration). Although some
authorities appear to be otherwise, it will usually be found that there are special circumsta~ces
bolstering what is termed the moral obligat10n.
The difficulty we see with the doctrine is that
8

if a mere moral, as distinguished from a legal
obligation were recognized as valid consideration for a contract, that would practically erode
to the vanishing point the necessity for finding
consideration. This is so, first because in nearly
all circumstances where a promise is made there
is some moral aspect of the situation which provides the motivation for making the promise
even if it is to make an outright gift. And second, if we are dealing with moral concepts, the
making of a promise itself creates a moral obligation to perform it. It seems obvious that if
a contract to be legally enforceable need be anything other than a naked promise, something
more than a mere moral consideration is necessary. The principle that in order for a contract
to be valid and binding, each party must be
bound to give some legal consideration to the
other by conferring a benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his request is firmly
implanted in the roots of our law.
In the instant cause, we have a situation where,
under any justifiable theory, there was no consideration whatever for the execution of the alleged option.
The evidence fails to support the Intervenor that he
helped the deceased a lot on the place building sheds,
selling and buying, and other tasks, all at no cost to
the deceased. The alleged option itself is reputed to be
upon a past consideration which will not support it.
Viewerl in the light that there was a moral obligation
npon the part of the deceased, such moral obligation
did not constitute a valid consideration.
9

, POINT III
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE LOWER COURT
IN THE PRESENCE OF 'THE JURY.

The district court by inuendo indicated to the
jurors that it had an unfavorable opinion as related to
the testimony of expert witnesses. (See: Transcript
of Proceedings pg. 202, lines 3 and 4) ; and reference
to the Transcript of Proceedings discloses the lower
court's impatience with the testimony of Plaintiff's
highly qualified handwriting expert. (See: Transcript
of Proceedings pg. 161 lines 19 and 20); and the argumentative statements of the court in the presence of the
jury were most prejudicial. (See: Transcript of Proceedings, p. 161, lines 1 to 3 and 13 to 16; page 167,
lines 9 and 10; pg. 197, lines 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13; page
200, lines 4 and 5; comments of the court on pages 202
and 203; page 205 lines 8 to 16; and page 299 lines
3 to 8.)
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE GIVING OF
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

By instructing the jury that the Plaintiff was
"trying to defeat the effect of the written instrument
£ntitled 'Option to Purchase' ", the court impliedly instructed the jury that the Plaintiff was at fault in
prosecuting the law suit, and that his efforts to defeat
the option had failed.
The execution of the alleged "Option to Purchase"
having been placed in issue, and the signing of same
10

by the deceased having been denied; the burden of
going forward with the evidence shifted to the Plaintiff, but the burden of proof, or risk of non-persuasion,
remained with the Intervenor thtoughout the trial to
establish the due and valid execution of th~ ,alleged
"Option to Purchase." HQwever, the district court's
instruction "that as a written instrument, said 'Option to Purchase' is endowed with a presumption of
validity." And that, "This presumption of validity can
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence and
the burden is on the defendant (Plaintiff) as Execute>r
of the estate of Clarence Anderson, deceased, to produce
such clear and convincing evidence." Such instruction
placed the full burden of proof on the Plaintiff to sustain his position. 32 C.J .S. Evidence, p. 793, Sec. 625
reads:
The admission of the instrument on preliminary proof of its execution does not relieve
the party of the burden of proving to the jury
its due and valid execution, and questions as to
its genuineness, the weight to be accorded Jt,
and the like, are for the jury.
The Intervenor was the one upon whom first fell
the duty of going forward with evidence. After mee~
ing that duty, and making out a prima facie case, the
burden shifted to the Plaintiff, but the risk of nonpersuasion never shifted, and remained the burden of
the Intervenor throughout the trial. Kartchner v.
Horne, 1Utah2d 112, 262 P. 2d 749.
11

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INTERROGATORY
NO. 2.

"Did the deceased know or understand what he
was signing or as a reasonable person should he have
known or understood what he was signing?" The district court regarded the illiteracy of the deceased as
a question of law. (See: Transcript, page 49, lines 6 to
10; and page 54, line 26; page 55 and page 56, lines

lto7).

POINT VI
BY ITS DECREE THE LOWER COURT AWARDED
THE INTERVENOR LANDS NOT EMBRACED WITHIN
THE ALLEGED "OPTION TO PURCHASE."

The alleged option covers "From 3,800 to 4,200
acres of range ground located at Scofield, Carbon
County, Utah * * *."And, "The farm located in Miller
Creek consisting of around 200 acres* * *."The lower
court's decree, in addition, covers 160 acres of land
classified in the Findings and Decree as Mountain land
which is in the joint names of Clarence Anderson and
Henry 0. Anderson, one of the defendants in the action. This land is described as the SE% of Section 34,
Township 12 South, Range 7 East, SLB & M. (Page
4 of the Findings, page 2 of the Decree) . The lower
court's Findings in addition also include 640 acres described as valley land and specifically described as all
of Section 2, Township 15 South, Range 9 East SLB &
M. (Page 5 of the Findings, and page 3 of the Decree).
12

The lands in Section 16 and 21, Township 15
South, Range 10 East, SLB & M. descrited at page 5
of the Findings and page 3 of the Decree total 240
acres which exceeds the 200 acres of farm land in
Miller Creek referred to in the alleged option. The 640
acres of land in Section 2 is in a different township and
range and is not in Miller Creek but is located approximately four miles Northwesterly from the farm
on Miller Creek. This 640 acres was acquired by Clarence Anderson after the date of the alleged option and
was purchased by him from the State of Utah. This
640 acres is not farming land and cannot be farmed
as the same lies above the irrigation canals.
The Intervenor did not introduce any testimony
at the trial to identify the particular tracts of land as
being within the general descripton of "range land
located at Scofield" and "farm land located in Miller
Creek" as set forth in the alleged option. All that was
introduced was the Inventory and Appraisement in the
probate proceedings in the Clarence Anderson estate.
This inventory at best could only be construed to describe the land that Clarence Anderson owned at the
time of his death and would not be evidence of what
he owned on the date of the alleged option.
POINT VII
THE ALLEGED OPTION IS NOT BINDING UPON
THE PARTNERSHIP OR THE SURVIVING PARTNER.

The property which is the subject of the alleged
option belonged to the partnership comprised of the
13

decedent, Clarence Anderson, and the defendant,
Henry 0. Anderson. Record title to part of the land
was and still is in the name of Clarence and title to
part was and still is in the name of Henry. By mutual
agreement Henry withdrew from the partnership and
Clarence continued to operate the partnership property. No final settlement was made prior to the death
of Clarence. The alleged option was not signed by
Henry and Henry had no knowledge of its execution
by Clarence. (See Stipulation and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in case file.)
That the partnership was not terminated by the
withdrawal of Henry is made clear by Sec. 48-1-27,
UCA, 1953, which provides as follows:
"On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed."
Sec. 48-1-32, UCA, 1953, specifies the authority
of a partner to bind the partnership after dissolution,
providing in part:
" ( 1) After dissolution a partner can bind
the partnership, ... :
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up
partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution."
It seems clear that the option given by Clarence
does not come within the meaning of the provision
"completing transactions unfinished at dissolution".
There were no negotiations for sale of the property to
intervenor pending at the time of dissolution.
14

The precise question is whether or not the option
to sell all of the partnership property given by one o:f
the partners after dissolution falls within the meaning
of "any act appropriate for winding up partnership
affairs". Winding up of partnership affairs m2ans
the administration of the 'assets for the purpose of
terminating the business and discharging the obligations of the partnership to its creditors and members.
Duncan v. Bartle (Oregon, 1950), 216 P.2d 1005,
1013.
The general rule as to the power of a partner
after dissolution is set forth in 40 Am. Jur, Partnership 318, Sec. 274, as follows:
"Upon the dissolution or termination of a
partnership the general agency of. one partner
for his copartners ceases, although the mutual
agency to a certain extent is prolonged until
the affairs of the partnership are administered
and wound up. As between themselves, neither
partner after dissolution has any power whatever to act for or bind the other. And as regards
third persons, the dissolution of the partnership
works an absolute ·revocation of all implied
authority in either of the partners to bind the
other to new contracts or obligations, or to create
any new cause of action binding copartners or
the firm, except when made by express author1·ty; ... "
Of similar import is 68 CJS Partnership, 868,
Sec. 362:
"The general rule is that the dissolution. of
a partnership terminates the implied authonty
of each partner to enter into new obligations
15

on behalf of the firm or of his copartners; but
this rule does not prevent the contracting or incurring of obligations, in the due course of settling the affairs of the partnership, by reason
of transactions prior to the dissolution."
As to the power of a liquidating partner in winding up the partnership, 40 Am Jur, Partnership 325,
Sec. 283 states:
"By virtue of his appointment he does not
possess any power he did not have before, and
without express authorization he cannot bind
the partnership in any manner or for any purpose not before within the ordinary powers of
a partner. Thus, a liquidating partner cannot
make new contracts, or create new liabilities
as by giving promissory notes binding on the
firm; nor can he extend the time for the payment of existing obligations of the firm, or make
acknowledgements of the validity of claims
against the firm. For the purpose of winding up
the concern however, the liquidating partner has
the same general power to bind the firm as he
had before, and may bind the partnership by
borrowing money to meet its accruing liabilities,
and may sell its real estate to raise money to
pay its debts."
At the time the alleged option was executed by
the deceased there was no necessity to sell the property
in order to pay partnership debts. The option constitut·
ed a new contract, of which the defendant had no
knowledge. By the terms of the option, Intervenor was
to have 6 years in which to exercise it and if exercised,
a 17 year period in which to make payment. This con·
stituted a new obligation upon the partnership which
16

was beyond the power of the deceased to make. When
a partnership is dissolved the authority of one partner
to create a new obligation for the partnership is revoked and his agency for his copartners ends. Credit
Bureau of San Diego v. Beach (Calif. 1956), 301 P
2nd 87, 90.
CONCLUSION
The decree and judgment of the lower court should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
S. J. SWEETRING
Attorney for Plaintiff &
Appellant
FRANDSEN and KELLER
Attorneys for Defendants &
Appellant
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